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Abstract
The article considers the phenomenon of price behavior in markets of joint products . 
It shows that conclusions about the nature of economic entities’ behavior on this type 
of market could be inaccurate if the characteristics of these markets, such as joint costs, 
are not taken into account. For this purpose, a theoretical model, built according to 
basic micro economic principals, is applied. This model provides an opportunity to re-
veal — without further new institutional analysis — that the reason for price deviation 
from a competitive level does not always lie in actions restricting competition. 
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1. Introduction
This analysis is motivated by a sound antitrust case brought by the Federal 
Antitrust Services of Russia (hereafter FAS) against Russian companies in the 
FKHPLFDOLQGXVWU\LQZKLFKZDVFORVHGE\¿QDOFRXUWGHFLVLRQLQ$SULO1 
 ً 7KHXSGDWHG(QJOLVKYHUVLRQRIWKHDUWLFOHSXEOLVKHGLQ5XVVLDQLQVoprosy Ekonomiki, 2015, No. 2, pp. 104–122. 
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Three interconnected cases were brought against companies operating in the mar-
NHWV RI FKORULQH OLTXLG FDXVWLF VRGD DQG SRO\YLQ\OFKORULGH 39& 7KHFDVH RQ
the market of chlorine was brought on the basis of an investigation launched by 
WKHXQVFKHGXOHGLQVSHFWLRQRIWKH&DXVWLFFRPSDQ\9ROJRJUDGZKHQGRFXPHQWV
proving a price maintenance and market sharing agreement were revealed. The in-
vestigation was continued by other unscheduled inspections when corresponding 
documents were found. According to these documents, the cartel on the market of 
chlorine took place over 3.5 years and led to an increase in prices by a factor of 
3.5 times. An investigation in the market of caustic soda was also based on unschedu-
led inspections and economic analysis that revealed a cartel operating since 2005 
WKURXJKRXWWKHHQWLUHFRXQWU\8QVFKHGXOHGLQVSHFWLRQVDQGHFRQRPLFDQDO\VLVZHUH
DOVRXVHGIRUDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQRQWKHPDUNHWRI39&,WZDVUHYHDOHGWKDWWKHFDUWHO
RQWKLVPDUNHWZDVDOUHDG\DWOHDVW¿YH\HDUVROG$UWHPLHYHWDOSS±
Despite the fact that in each case the antitrust authority possesses documents 
proving, as it seems, agreement, the conclusions of appellate courts where de-
cisions by the FAS were contested were not unambiguous, which is the conse-
quence of the peculiarities of these markets. 
One of the key arguments of the FAS proving a price maintenance agreement 
is the fact that the domestic price of liquid caustic soda exceeds its export price 
(Artemiev et al., 2013, pp. 66–67). According to the antitrust authority, this fact 
implies intensive competition on the foreign market and weak competition on 
the domestic market. 
The case on the market of caustic soda ended up with the win of companies, 
and one of the decisive arguments was that there is constant relationship between 
the production of caustic soda and the production of chlorine, and this relation-
ship explains the behavior of companies in corresponding markets.
The main goal of this study is to show, basing on the neoclassical model, that the 
difference in prices pointed out by FAS can be a consequence of the peculiarities of 
production and is not necessarily caused by a market structure. In turn, the approach 
of the antitrust authority that disregards these particularities could lead to  errors of 
law enforcement (in this case — a type 1 error — unreasonable accusation). 
 The key particularity in the production of caustic soda is that the latter is pro-
GXFHG LQ ¿[HG SURSRUWLRQZLWK FKORULQH ,IZLWKLQ DVLQJOH SURGXFWLRQ SURFHVV
two or more products are manufactured, these products are called joint products. 
Costs of production of this type of product are joint until the split-off point. In 
turn, the split-off point is the stage in the production process after which joint 
SURGXFWV IROORZ WKHLURZQSDWWHUQV7KHUHDUH MRLQWSURGXFWV LQ¿[HGDQGYDUL-
able proportions. The chemical industry provides a variety of examples of joint 
SURGXFWVERWKLQ¿[HGDQGYDULDEOHSURSRUWLRQV.UHSV7KHSURGXFWLRQRI
chlorine and caustic soda is one such example. 
7KHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHTXHVWLRQXQGHUUHYLHZJRHVEH\RQGQRWRQO\WKHLPSRU-
tant and particular case of caustic soda and chlorine but also beyond the chemical 
(continued)/WG1RYRPRVNRYVNLM+ORU 1HZ0RVFRZ&KORULQHJURXSRIFRPSDQLHV2-6&%DVKNLUVNDMD
+LPLMD &KHPLVWU\ RI %DVKNLULD 2-6& .DXVWLN &DXVWLF 6WHUOLWDPDN JURXS RI FRPSDQLHV &-6&
5HQRYD2UJVLQWH]2-6&+LPSURP1RYRFKHERNVDUVNJURXSRIFRPSDQLHV/WG1LNRKLP2-6&.DXVWLF
&DXVWLF 9ROJRJUDGJURXSRIFRPSDQLHV2-6&*DOR3ROLPHU/WG*DOR3ROLPHU.LURYR&KHSHWVNJURXS
RI FRPSDQLHV /WG 7RUJRY\M 'RP +LPSURP )LUP +LPSURP .HPHURYR /WG 3URGXFWLRQ$VVRFLDWLRQ
+LPSURP.HPHURYR
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industry. In addition, analysis of this question shows that the tradition of hostility 
in antitrust revealed by Coase more than forty years ago (Coase, 1972) has a more 
complicated structure because even disregarding the tools of New Institutional 
(FRQRPLFVDQGEDVHGRQWKHDQDO\VLVRI1HRFODVVLFDO(FRQRPLFVLWLVSRVVLEOHWR
H[SODLQ³DQRPDOLHV´WKDWIRUPWKHRFFDVLRQIRUDFFXVDWLRQRIPDUNHWSDUWLFLSDQWV
in infringement of competition law. 
7KH¿UVWSDUWRIWKHDUWLFOHSURYLGHVDUHYLHZRIWKHPDLQLGHDVRIWKHFRQFHSW
of joint products based on other studies on this topic. The next three parts rep-
resent the model considered equilibrium conditions under competition and mo-
nopoly on markets of joint products, different reasons for a glut and wastage. 
In addition, the possibility of separate processing and transportation to a distant 
market (open economy) of a co-product is taken into account. The conclusion 
provides the results of the analysis. 
2. Joint products 
The question of joint products is a subject of a series of works based on micro-
economic models taking into account their different particularities. In this way, 
Deutsch (1965, pp. 397–401), using the example of the markets of chlorine and 
caustic soda in Canada, shows that complicated transportation and the moderate 
FRVWRIWKHZDVWDJHRIDJOXWRIRQHRIWKHMRLQWSURGXFWVLQÀXHQFHWKHSDUDPHWHUV
of markets. According to the Deutsch, the pricing policy of a company manu-
facturing these products is reminiscent of price discrimination on a territorial 
basis, but in reality, it could be the consequence of high transportation costs and 
a problem of the wastage of a glut. 
Some articles concern the problem of cost allocations to joint products. Manes 
and Smith (1965, pp. 31–35) suggest an approach where costs are allocated ac-
cording to the marginal revenue from sale of each of them. The authors also de-
¿QHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQFRSURGXFWVDQGE\SURGXFWV7KH\RIIHUWRFRQVLGHU
a product as a by-product if it does not contribute to the sum of marginal revenue 
at an equilibrium point. This product should be disposed of at marginal revenue 
HTXDOWR]HUR7KLVFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHFRVWDOORFDWLRQVXFKWKDWDOOFRVWVDUHDS-
plied to a major product and the production of a by-product until the split-off 
point is assumed to be free of charge. If a by-product is separately processed 
LQRXUH[DPSOH²SURGXFWLRQRIFKORULQDWHGGHULYDWLYHIRULQVWDQFH39&WKHQ
the volume of its sale should correspond to the level where its marginal revenue 
equals the marginal cost of separate processing. Another article (Jensen, 1974, 
pp. 465–476) that also concerns the question of cost allocations to joint products 
FRQVLGHUV WKHFDVHZKHQ WKHSULFH RI DE\SURGXFW ZLWK WKHVDPHGH¿QLWLRQRI
a by-product) could differ from the marginal cost of separate processing. The rea-
son is that the price of a by-product depends not only on cost of separate pro-
cessing but also on opportunity cost of selling a by-product at the split-off point. 
If this price is negative, meaning that the alternative of separate processing is 
wastage involving cost, the price of the separately processed good is lower than 
marginal cost of separate processing. 
In turn, Walters (1960) offers to employ the demand function for joint products 
in the form of probability distribution that enables high uncertainty level on mar-
kets for these products to be taken into account. 
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 In one more article concerning joint products (Colberg, 1941, pp. 103–110), 
the author explains the appearance of a glut (the difference between output and 
the volume sold) not only by limited demand for a product but also by the reason-
LQJRIDPRQRSROLVWPD[LPL]LQJSUR¿W$V IDUDV WKHZDVWDJHRIRQHRI WKHMRLQW
products enables interdependence of their sales to be avoided, a company can de-
crease sales of one product keeping the sales of another product constant. In turn, 
%ODLUDQG+D\QHVH[WHQGWKHDQDO\VLVRIPDUNHWVRIMRLQWSURGXFWVDGGLQJ
PRQRSVRQ\RQRQHRIWKHPDQGVKRZLQJKRZWKLVWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIDPRGHOLQÀX-
ences wealth, market equilibrium, and the market power of a company, if it has one. 
Graham and Green (1984) use the concept of joint products (products manu-
factured from one input2) in their analysis of households, where input is time and 
joint products are home production and leisure. 
)LQDOO\VHYHUDODUWLFOHVFRQVLGHUWKHLQÀXHQFHRIJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\DQGPDU-
NHW ÀXFWXDWLRQV RQ MRLQW SURGXFWLRQ +RXFN  3LJJRWW DQG :RKOJHQDQW
2002). In particular, they study the relationship between demand for joint prod-
ucts and aggregate demand for their common input. 
(DFKRIWKHVHPRGHOVFRQVLGHUVRQHRUVHYHUDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIMRLQWSURGXFWV
but does not study their interrelationship and a general effect on parameters of mar-
kets. This reveals a theoretical gap that impedes the analysis of the question under 
review using existing models. The new approach to modeling the decision-making 
process of a company manufacturing joint products and equilibrium on correspond-
ing markets, based on the experience of preceding works, is elabo rated. The new 
PRGHO WDNHV LQWR DFFRXQW WKHSHFXOLDULWLHV RI SURGXFWLRQERWK LQ¿[HGSURSRUWLRQ
HTXDOWRRQHDQGLQRWKHU¿[HGSURSRUWLRQVMRLQWFRVWVFRVWRIZDVWDJHLQFOXGLQJ
prohibitively high cost of wastage), and the possibility of separate processing and 
transportation of a glut. The distinctive features of the new model are the following. 
First, it considers different reasons for a glut that enable the comparison of outcomes 
on competitive markets and monopolistic markets. Second, it takes into account 
the possibility of separate processing and transportation as the ways to dispose of 
a glut on a different market that is an alternative to wastage. This enables the com-
prehensive analysis of the effect of a glut on the parameters of markets. 
The new model reveals probable law enforcement errors that take place on 
markets of joint products because the peculiarities of these markets are not taken 
into account by the antitrust authority.  
3. Equilibrium on markets of joint products 
%\WKHLUQDWXUHFRPSDQLHVZLWKMRLQWSURGXFWLRQDUHPXOWLSURGXFWFRPSDQLHVEH-
FDXVH WKH\ UHFHLYH SUR¿WV IURP VHOOLQJ VHYHUDO SURGXFWV7KHSUR¿W RI VXFK D¿UP
LVFRPSRVLWHDQGFRQVLVWVRISUR¿WV IURPVHOOLQJRIHDFKSURGXFWPDQXIDFWXUHGE\
WKHFRPSDQ\ DJJUHJDWHSUR¿W$VVXPH WKDW WKHUH LVQR UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ MRLQW
SURGXFWVRQWKHGHPDQGVLGHEXWE\GH¿QLWLRQWKHLUSURGXFWLRQDQGKHQFHVXSSOLHVDUH
interrelated, which means that the production of one product implies the production of 
DQRWKHUSURGXFWLQSDUWLFXODUWKHDPRXQWLQWKHFDVHRI¿[HGSURSRUWLRQRIMRLQWSUR-
GXFWLRQ+HQFHVXFKSURGXFWVKDYHMRLQWFRVWVDQGMRLQWVXSSO\7KHVHSDUWLFXODULWLHV
 2 Strictly speaking, the general idea of the analysis does not change if there is more than one input. For 
example, in the case of chlorine and caustic inputs there are salt brine and electricity. 
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RIMRLQWSURGXFWLRQWUDQVIRUPWKHPD[LPL]DWLRQSUREOHPRIFRPSDQLHVSURGXFLQJWKLV
type of product as follows. First, such a company cannot determine the optimal level 
RIRXWSXWRIHDFKSURGXFWVHSDUDWHO\7KHRXWSXWFKRLFHRIRQHSURGXFWWKDWPD[LPL]HV
SUR¿WDPDMRUSURGXFWLPSOLHVRXWSXWRIRWKHUSURGXFWVFRSURGXFWVWKURXJK¿[HG
SURSRUWLRQ 7KHRSWLPDO RXWSXW RI DPDMRU SURGXFW VKRXOG PD[LPL]H DFRPSDQ\¶V
DJJUHJDWHSUR¿WPHDQLQJ WKDW LWVKRXOG WDNH LQWRDFFRXQW WKHFRQVHTXHQWRXWSXWRI
FRSURGXFWV6HFRQGDQHZGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHDSSHDUVLQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VPD[LPL]D-
WLRQSUREOHPZKLFKLVWKHOHYHORIVDOHRIFRSURGXFWV8VXDOO\FRPSDQLHVSURGXFHDV
much as they plan to sell. In the case of joint production, companies lose the ability to 
determine the optimal level of production of each product. Companies need to choose 
the level of sale of co-products and provide the possibility of achieving this level. 
In summary:
x REMHFWLYHIXQFWLRQRIDFRPSDQ\²DJJUHJDWHSUR¿W
x PD[LPL]LQJYDULDEOHV²RXWSXWOHYHORIDPDMRUSURGXFWDQGWKHOHYHOVRIVDOHRI
FRSURGXFWV
x FRQVWUDLQWV²RXWSXWIXQFWLRQDFFRUGLQJWR¿[HGSURSRUWLRQDQGFRQGLWLRQVWKDW
provide the possibility of achieving the optimal level of sale of co-products.
7KHGHPDUFDWLRQEHWZHHQDPDMRUSURGXFWDQGFRSURGXFWVLVEDVHGRQWKHSUR¿W
DELOLW\RIWKHLUVDOH7RFRPSDUHSUR¿WDELOLW\ZHQHHGWRUHSUHVHQWWKHSUR¿WDELOLW\
of each product in one dimension. In the model offered the dimension chosen is 
the output of one of the products. This means that the demand for all products and 
corresponding marginal revenue are represented through output of this product . 
A major product is a product with the highest marginal revenue at the optimal 
point.3 The output level of such a product then coincides with its sale level. For 
simplicity take output level of a major product as a dimension. 
&RQVLGHU WKHPD[LPL]DWLRQ SUREOHP RI DFRPSDQ\ PDQXIDFWXULQJ WZR MRLQW
products. One of these products is a major product, and its output is equal to its 
level of sale. The second product is a co-product, and in particular circumstances 
its level of sale can differ from its output level. 
Assume the following reverse demand functions:
P1  =  a1  –  b1Q1 (1)
P2  =  a2  –  b2 ȡ41, (2)
where Q1²RXWSXW RI WKH¿UVW SURGXFWȡ ²¿[HG SURSRUWLRQ RI SURGXFWLRQ
(Q2  =  ȡ41), P1,  P2²SULFHV IRU WKH¿UVW DQG WKHVHFRQG SURGXFWV UHVSHFWLYHO\
a1,  a2  t²UHVHUYH SULFHV IRU WKH¿UVW DQG WKHVHFRQG SURGXFWV UHVSHFWLYHO\
b1,  b2  t²VHQVLWLYLWLHVRIGHPDQGIRUWKH¿UVWDQGWKHVHFRQGSURGXFWVUHVSHFWLYHO\
Then, the marginal revenues from sale of each product have the following form:
MR1(Q1)  =  a1  –  2b1Q1 (3)
MR2(Q1)  =  ȡD2  –  2b2ȡ2Q1 (4)
 3 In this case it is assumed that the relation between marginal revenues corresponds to the relation between 
gross revenues. There could be the case when they do not correspond to each other due to (a) the correlation of 
reserve prices, (b) the correlation of demand price elasticities, or (c) the marginal cost. 
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7KH¿UVWSURGXFW LV DPDMRUSURGXFW LI WKHFRQGLWLRQMR1(Q1*)  >  MR2(Q1*) is 
VDWLV¿HG ,Q VXFK DZD\ZH REWDLQ WKH¿UVWPD[LPL]DWLRQ YDULDEOH²RXWSXW RI
a major product (Q1    0). 
7KHDJJUHJDWHSUR¿WRIDFRPSDQ\PDQXIDFWXULQJMRLQWSURGXFWVFRQVLVWVRI
revenue from sale of each product minus the cost of production. The latter in 
the case of joint production can be represented as a function of output of one of 
products. Representing joint costs as a function of a major product: 
TC  =  TC (Q1)  (5)
MC  =  c (6)
ʌ  TR1(Q1)  +  TR2(Q1)  –  TC(Q1)  =  (a1  –  b1Q1)Q1  +  
 +   (a2  –  b2ȡ41)ȡ41  –  TC(Q1) (7)
0D[LPL]DWLRQ RI SUR¿W ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKHRXWSXW RI DPDMRU SURGXFW JLYHV
the optimal output of a major product and corresponding output of a co-product 
(see Appendix A). 
 (8)
 (9)
+HQFHRSWLPDORXWSXWVRISURGXFWVGHSHQGRQFRVWRISURGXFWLRQDQGSDUDPHWHUV
RIGHPDQGIXQFWLRQVRIERWKJRRGVDQGDYDOXHRI¿[HGSURSRUWLRQ
The optimal level of sale of a major product always coincides with its output:
Q1ƍ =  Q1  (10)
$V IRU DFRSURGXFW WKHUH FRXOG EH WKUHH FDVHV ,Q WKH¿UVW FDVH WKHRS-
WLPDO OHYHO RI RXWSXW RI WKH¿UVW SURGXFW LV EHORZ WKHOHYHOZKHUH FRUUHVSRQG-
LQJ PDUJLQDO UHYHQXH IURP WKHVDOH RI WKHVHFRQG SURGXFW LV HTXDO WR ]HUR
ȡ41*  <  ȡ41(MR2(Q1)  =  0) or Q1*  <  Q1(MR2(Q1)  =  0). Maximum revenue from sale 
RI WKHVHFRQG SURGXFWZKHQPDUJLQDO UHYHQXH LV VWULFWO\ JUHDWHU WKDQ ]HUR LV
achieved at the lowest marginal revenue. As far as marginal revenue is concerned 
a decreasing function of the level of sales (05/41)  <  0, the optimal level of 
sale is equal to the maximum possible level that is the whole output. This means 
WKDWWKHZKROHRXWSXWFDQEHVROGZLWKPD[LPXPSUR¿W
Q2ƍ  =  ȡ41  (11)
where Q2ƍ²WKHYROXPHRIVHFRQGSURGXFWVDOHV
The second situation takes place when the optimal output of a major product 
JLYHVVXFKRXWSXWRIDFRSURGXFWWKDWPDUJLQDOUHYHQXHRILWVVDOHLVHTXDOWR]HUR
ȡ41* = ȡ41(MR2(Q1)  =  0) or Q1* = Q1(MR2(Q1)  =  0). In this case the whole output 
FDQEHVROGZLWKPD[LPXPSUR¿WZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWR
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,QWKHWKLUGVLWXDWLRQWKHRSWLPDOOHYHORIRXWSXWRIWKH¿UVWSURGXFWLVDERYH
the level where corresponding marginal revenue from the sale of the second 
SURGXFWLVHTXDOWR]HURȡ41*  >  ȡ41(MR2(Q1)  =  0) or Q1*  >  Q1(MR2(Q1)  =  0). It is 
XQSUR¿WDEOHWRVHOOWKHZKROHRXWSXWZKHQPDUJLQDOUHYHQXHLVEHORZ]HUR7KLV
implies the appearance of a glut (X ) — the difference between the level of output 
and the level sale. 
X  =  ȡ41± Q2ƍ  (12)
The level of sale of a co-product that can either coincide or not coincide with its 
OHYHORIRXWSXWLVWKHVHFRQGPD[LPL]DWLRQYDULDEOH7KHFRUUHVSRQGLQJFRQVWUDLQW
is then the following: 
Q2ƍ  ȡ41  (13)
where Q2ƍ²OHYHORIVDOHRIDFRSURGXFW
Which of the underlined cases takes place depends on demand param-
eters (a1,  a2, b1,  b2 DYDOXH RI ¿[HG SURSRUWLRQ ȡ) and marginal cost (c) (see 
$SSHQGL[%7KHORZHU WKHPDUJLQDO FRVW WKHKLJKHU WKHSUREDELOLW\ RI DJOXW
DQGWKHODJHULVLWVVL]H&RQVWDQWUHWXUQVWRVFDOHSHUIHFWO\HODVWLFLQYHUVHIXQF-
tion of marginal revenue) give an unambiguous effect of demand parameters 
(a1,  a2+LJKGHPDQGIRUDPDMRUSURGXFWa1OHDGVWRKLJKSUREDELOLW\RIDJOXW
high demand for a co-product (a2) has the inverse effect. The effect of slopes of 
demand (b1,  b2) is uncertain and depends on the relationship between parameters. 
7KHVDPHFDQEHVDLGDERXWDYDOXHRI¿[HGSURSRUWLRQȡ). 
4. Possible reasons for a glut
7KHPDLQ FKDUDFWHULVWLF RI PDUNHWV RI MRLQW SURGXFWV LQ ¿[HG SURSRUWLRQ LV
a glut, which is the difference between output and sold volume of a product. 
2XWSXWRIDPDMRUSURGXFWE\GH¿QLWLRQFRLQFLGHVZLWKWKHYROXPHRILWVVDOHV
A part of a co-product called a glut under some conditions is wasted. Assume 
that wastage of a glut involves no expense and consider possible reasons for its 
appearance. 
$VPHQWLRQHGDERYHWKHSUREDELOLW\RIDSSHDUDQFHRIDJOXWDQGLWVVL]HGH-
pend on demand parameters and marginal cost. Assume that slopes of reverse 
demand functions are equal (b1  =  b2DQG¿[HGSURSRUWLRQLV
7KH¿UVWUHDVRQIRUDJOXWLVWKHPDUNHWSRZHURIDFRPSDQ\RQERWKPDUNHWV
7KHFRQGLWLRQIRUDJOXWLQWKLVFDVHLVWKHORZPDUJLQDOFRVWDQGVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHU-
ence in demand for a major product and a co-product (a1  >  a2) and hence in their 
corresponding marginal revenues. 
 This situation is represented on the graph below (Fig. 1), where MC — func-
WLRQ RI PDUJLQDO FRVWMR1,  MR2 — functions of marginal revenue of a major 
SURGXFW DQG DFRSURGXFW UHVSHFWLYHO\ MRtotal  — the sum of marginal reve-
QXHVD1,  D2 — demand functions. The point of intersection of the marginal cost 
curve and the total marginal revenue curve takes place on the part of the latter 
that coincides with the marginal revenue of a major product. The optimal level 
of output of a major product is equal to Q1*. Fixed proportion 1:1 implies that 
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output of a co-product is equal to the same amount. The optimal level of a co-
product sales is lower than its output and corresponds to the point where its 
PDUJLQDOUHYHQXHLVHTXDOWR]HURZKLFKLVWKHEUHDNSRLQWRIWKHWRWDOPDUJLQDO
revenue curve Q1(MR2(Q1)  =  0). This leads to a glut of a co-product equal to 
Q1*  –  Q1(MR2(Q1)  =  0).
A glut can also appear when both markets are competitive but when demand 
IRUDPDMRUSURGXFWVLJQL¿FDQWO\H[FHHGVGHPDQGIRUDFRSURGXFWa1  >  a2) and 
marginal cost is low. This case is represented on the Fig. below (Fig. 2), where 
0&²IXQFWLRQRIPDUJLQDOFXUYHD1,  D2²GHPDQGIXQFWLRQVDtotal  — the sum 
RIGHPDQGV/LPLWHGGHPDQGIRUDFRSURGXFWOHDGVWRWKHVLWXDWLRQZKHQVDOH
of this product on the market at a positive price is impossible.
The optimal output of a major product and the corresponding output of a co-
SURGXFWXQGHUWKH¿[HGSURSRUWLRQDUHHTXDOWRQ1* that exceeds the amount, 
which can be sold under nonnegative price Q1(P2  =  0). This implies the appear-
ance of the glut equal to Q1*  –  Q1(P2  =  0).
+HQFHLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRGLIIHUHQWLDWHDJOXWWKDWLVDUHVXOWRISUR¿WPD[LPL]D-
tion when a company possesses market power and a glut that is a result of  limited 
Fig. 1. A glut when there is market power in both markets. 
Fig. 2. A glut when both markets are competitive.
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GHPDQGZKHQPDUNHWVDUHFRPSHWLWLYH,QWKH¿UVWFDVHWKHOHYHORISURGXFWVDOHV
FDQLQÀXHQFHSULFHDQGKHQFHXQGHUVRPHFRQGLWLRQVDFRPSDQ\FDQ¿QGLWRSWL-
mal to waste a part of a product. In the second case, a company in principle can-
not sell part of a product on the market.
If the assumption that the sensitivities of demand in both markets are equal 
(b1b2) is relaxed, there could be the situation where a product with a higher re-
VHUYHSULFHKDVDJOXW7KLVVLWXDWLRQRFFXUVLIWKHVHQVLWLYLW\RILWVGHPDQGLVVLJQL¿-
cantly lower than the sensitivity of demand of the second product (a1a2, b1  >  b2). 
7KHQWKHPDUJLQDOUHYHQXHRIVXFKDSURGXFWXQGHUKLJKRXWSXWVLVHTXDOWR]HUR
while the marginal revenue from sale of the second product is positive. This implies 
that a product with a lower reserve price and higher sensitivity of demand is a major 
product, while a product with higher reserve price and lower sensitivity of demand 
is a co-product. 
5. Wastage of a glut 
When the wastage of a glut does not carry a cost, its appearance does not 
LQÀXHQFHHTXLOLEULXP,QWKLVSDUWFRQVLGHUWKHSUREOHPRIWKHZDVWDJHRIDJOXW
7KHUH FRXOG EH WKUHH VLWXDWLRQV LH ZDVWDJH LQYROYHV QR FRVW LQVLJQL¿FDQW
cost), wastage involves cost (moderate cost), wastage is impossible (prohibiti-
vely high cost).
7ZR FDVHVZKHQ DJOXW FDQ DSSHDUZHUH UHYHDOHG DERYH  LW LV SUR¿WDEOH
for a company possessing market power to waste a part of a co-product, (2) it is 
impossible to sell a part of a co-product due to limited demand for this product 
on the market.
First, consider the problem of wastage when a glut appears due to the ¿UVW
reason ,QWKLVFDVHDFRPSDQ\KDVPDUNHWSRZHUDQGPD[LPL]HVSUR¿WZLWKUH-
spect to two variables: output of a major product (Q1 ) and the level of sale of 
a co-product (Q2ƍ ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKHOHYHO RI VDOHRI DFRSURGXFW FDQQRW H[FHHG
its output level (Q2ƍ     ȡ41). The demand function of a major product then corre-
sponds to (1), while the demand function of a co-product differs from the demand 
function (2) and has the following form: 
P2  =  a2  –  b2Q2ƍ (14)
where a1,  a2,  b1,  b2,  Q1, Q2ƍP1, P2
Functions of total and marginal costs correspond to equations (5) and (6).
A glut is the difference between the output level of a co-product and its level 
of sale (12). 
$VVXPHWKDW¿[HGFRVWRIZDVWDJHLVHTXDOWR]HURPDUJLQDOFRVWRIZDVWDJHLV
FRQVWDQWDQGHTXDOWRG7KHSUR¿WPD[LPL]DWLRQSUREOHPLVWKHQWKHIROORZLQJ
max ʌ =  max (a2  –  b2Q2c)Q2c  +  (a1  –  b1Q1)Q1  –   TC(Q1)  –   d(ȡ41  –  Q2c) Q1, Q2ƍ Q1, Q2ƍ 
s.t. Q2ƍȡ41 (15)
$/DJUDQJHIXQFWLRQDQGFRUUHVSRQGLQJ.XKQ7XFNHUFRQGLWLRQVOHWXVDQDO\]H
WKHRXWFRPHVRIWKHRSWLPL]DWLRQSUREOHPVHH$SSHQGL[&DQGH[SUHVVDJOXW
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through the given parameters (see Appendix D). The result shows that the equa-
WLRQVL]HRIDJOXWLQYHUVHO\GHSHQGVRQPDUJLQDOFRVW7KHHIIHFWRIZDVWDJHFRVW
LVFRQWLQJHQWRQD¿[HGSURSRUWLRQDQGVHQVLWLYLWLHVRIGHPDQG
Consider three situations underlined above: (1) wastage involves no cost 
(d ZDVWDJHLVLPSRVVLEOHWKHUHVKRXOGEHQRJOXWZDVWDJHLQYROYHV
cost (d  >  0). 
7KH¿UVW FDVH RFFXUV ZKHQ Ȝ = 0, then Q2ƍ    ȡ41*. This means that under 
WKHSDUWLFXODUYDOXHRI¿[HGSURSRUWLRQȡ) output of a co-product and its optimal 
OHYHORIVDOHFRLQFLGHRWKHUZLVHWKHRSWLPDOOHYHORIVDOHRIDFRSURGXFWLVOHVV
than its output, with a glut equal to (ȡ41*  –  Q2ƍ!,QWKLVFDVHRXWSXWRIDPD-
jor product corresponds to the point where its marginal revenue is equal to mar-
ginal cost and sale of a co-product corresponds to the point where its marginal 
UHYHQXHLVHTXDOWR]HUR
The second case occurs when Ȝ  >  0. A glut is then impossible because 
Q2ƍ  =   ȡ41*. In this case the optimal output of a major product is less than output 
that corresponds to the point where its marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. 
The optimal level of sale of a co-product is greater than the level that corresponds 
WRWKHSRLQWZKHUHPDUJLQDOUHYHQXHRIDFRSURGXFWLVHTXDOWR]HUR
The third situation occurs when wastage is costly, meaning that d  >  0. In com-
SDULVRQ WR WKH¿UVW VLWXDWLRQZKHQZDVWDJHGRHVQRW LQYROYHFRVW WKHRSWLPDO
output of a major product is no longer equal to the amount at which marginal 
revenue is equal to marginal cost, and the optimal level of sale of a co-product 
GRHV QRW FRUUHVSRQG WR WKHOHYHO DWZKLFKPDUJLQDO UHYHQXH LV HTXDO WR ]HUR
The optimal output of a major product falls, and hence its optimal price increas-
HV7KHRSWLPDOOHYHORIVDOHRIDFRSURGXFWLQWXUQULVHVKHQFHLWVHTXLOLEULXP
price decreases. 
Consider the situation when a glut is impossible in greater detail. The dis-
tinctive feature of this situation is that a company moves its focus from a major 
product to a co-product, wastage of which is impossible. A company produces 
WKHDPRXQW RI DFRSURGXFW WKDW LW FDQ VHOO RQ DPDUNHWZLWKPD[LPXPSUR¿W
WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKHSUR¿WWKDWLWFDQUHFHLYHIURPVHOOLQJWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ
output of a major product. This situation is presented above under Ȝ  >  0, when 
ȡ41*  =  Q2ƍ)RUVLPSOLFLW\DVVXPHWKDWWKH¿[HGSURSRUWLRQLVHTXDOWR,IZDVW-
age is impossible a company should produce as much as it can sell on the market 
ZLWKPD[LPXPSUR¿W7KLV LPSOLHV WKDW WKHOHYHORI VDOHRI DFRSURGXFW LVQR
ORQJHUDPD[LPL]DWLRQYDULDEOHLQWKHSUR¿WIXQFWLRQQ2ƍ   =   ȡ41). An additional 
constraint is also needed: a nonnegative price of a co-product to preserve the pos-
sibility of selling this product on the market. 
P2  =  a2  –  b2Q2ƍ   0 (16)
Q1   
a2/b2 (17)
7KHSUR¿WPD[LPL]DWLRQSUREOHPWKHQKDVWKHIROORZLQJIRUP
max ʌ =  max (a1  –  b1Q1)Q1  +  (a2  –  b2Q1)Q1  –  TC(Q1) 
 
Q1 Q1
s.t. Q1  =  
a2/b2 (18)
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8VLQJ D/DJUDQJH IXQFWLRQ DQG FRUUHVSRQGLQJ.XKQ7DFNHU FRQGLWLRQV VHH
Appendix C) we get:
MRtotal  (4)  =  c  –  Ȝ (19)
We are interested only in cases with gluts. If ȡ  =  1, a glut appears when optimal 
output of a major product is greater than the output at which the corresponding 
PDUJLQDOUHYHQXHRIDFRSURGXFWLVHTXDOWR]HUR (Q1*  >  Q1(MR2  =  0)). This gives 
RQHPRUHFRQVWUDLQWRIWKHPD[LPL]DWLRQSUREOHPVHH$SSHQGL[&
Thus, if Ȝ  =  0, (a2/b2)  –  Q17KLVPHDQVWKDWHTXLOLEULXPFRUUHVSRQGVWR
the point where total marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost if the possibility 
of selling a co-product on this market is reserved. 
If Ȝ  >  0, Q1*  =  
a2/b2. Then, outputs of both products fall below the level where 
total marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. 
If the parameters of demand and cost functions lead to such an output of 
DPDMRUSURGXFWVHOOLQJZLWKPD[LPXPSUR¿W WKDW WKHUH LVDSRVVLELOLW\RIVHOO-
ing the corresponding output of a co-product on the market, then this output of 
a major product is optimal. When wastage is impossible, output and volume of 
sale of a co-product correspond to the level where its marginal revenue is below 
]HUR-RLQWFRVWVDUHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWZKHQRSWLPDORXWSXWRIDPDMRUSURGXFW
is determined, meaning that when wastage is impossible, the main condition for 
determining the volume of sale of a co-product is to charge for the latter non-
negative price. 
,IRXWSXWRIDPDMRUSURGXFW WKDWJLYHV WKHKLJKHVWSUR¿W IURP LWV VDOHFRUUH-
sponds to such an output of a co-product that a part of this output cannot be sold 
on a market, then the optimal output of a major product is equal to the maximum 
level at which the corresponding output of a co-product can be sold on the market. 
Next, consider the situation when a glut appears due to the second reason, not 
EHFDXVHDFRPSDQ\ LV VHHNLQJDGGLWLRQDOSUR¿WEXWEHFDXVH LW LV LPSRVVLEOH WR
sell a part of a co-product on the market. This situation takes place when a com-
pany makes a decision under condition of competition. Then, P1, P2 are prices of 
WKH¿UVWDQGWKHVHFRQGJRRGUHVSHFWLYHO\
To let a company choose the optimal output assume increasing marginal cost 
(05/41 )  >  0).
If there is a glut on the competitive market, a company sells a maximum vol-
XPHRIDFRSURGXFWWKDWLVHTXDOWRGHPDQGIRUWKLVSURGXFWDW]HURSULFHVQ2ƍ
+HQFHYROXPHRIVDOHRIDFRSURGXFWLVQRWWKHPD[LPL]DWLRQYDULDEOHLQWKLV
FDVH7KHSUR¿WIXQFWLRQKDVWKHIROORZLQJIRUP
ʌ  P1Q1 +  P2Q2ƍ  –  TC(Q1)  –   d (ȡ41 –  Q2ƍ ) (20)
When wastage of a glut does not involve additional cost (d = 0),
max ʌ o  P1  =  MC(Q1) (21)
 
Q1
When marginal cost of wastage is positive ( d > 0), 
max ʌ o  P1 –  MC(Q1)  –  pd  =  0 (22)
 
Q1
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This can be expressed as P1 =  MC(Q1*)  +  pd or P1  –  pd  =  MC(Q1*). This means 
that under positive cost of wastage the optimal output of a major product and cor-
responding output of a co-product fall. 
If wastage is impossible, the output of a co-product should be equal to the maxi-
mum possible level of sale of a co-product (ȡ41* =  Q2ƍ7KHRSWLPDORXWSXWRI
a major product is then proportional to the maximum level of a co-product that 
can be sold on the market (see Appendix C). 
The model constructed gives an opportunity to make the following supposi-
tions about the markets of chlorine and caustic soda in Russia. First, the techno-
logical characteristics of chlorine and caustic soda are such that wastage of both 
products involves additional cost, and in the case of caustic soda, the cost is pro-
hibitively high. According to the model, if there is a glut of caustic soda, then its 
output level should correspond to its optimal level of sale. This leads to the situ-
ation when the real optimal output of chlorine is lower than its optimal output as 
if peculiarities of chlorine’s production and impossibility of caustic’s wastage 
DUHQRWWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWWKHUHDORSWLPDOOHYHORIVDOHRIFDXVWLFLVKLJKHUWKDQ
the corresponding optimal level. This rule is valid either if a company has market 
power or is under competitive conditions. 
Second, if there is a glut of chlorine, then a company needs to take into account 
the cost of wastage of chlorine when it determines its optimal level of output and 
sale. Then, the real optimal output of caustic soda is lower than the optimal out-
put that does not take into account peculiarities of production and cost of wastage 
of chlorine. In turn, the real optimal output of chlorine is higher than the corre-
sponding optimal level because an alternative for sale of the latter is wastage that 
involves additional cost. 
Third, an additional observation is the fact that if the market of caustic soda 
is competitive, then for a company to make a decision to sell this product on 
the market its price should be higher than the marginal cost because in addition 
to the latter, the unavoidable cost of wastage of chlorine is taken into account. 
6. Separate processing and an open economy 
In the analysis above the only way to let output and the level of sale of a co-
product to differ is the wastage of a glut. The possibility of separate processing 
or sale of a product on a distant market (including export) adds a new market 
to the model. In this analysis a new market is considered as a way to dispose of 
DJOXW$Q³ROG´PDUNHWWKHQLVDQREMHFWLYHPDUNHWPHDQLQJWKDWDFRPSDQ\VHOOV
ZLWKPD[LPXPSUR¿WERWKDPDMRUSURGXFWDQGDFRSURGXFWRQWKLVPDUNHWDQG
in the case of a glut may separately process and sell it on a different market or 
WUDQVSRUWDQGVHOOLWRQDGLVWLQFWPDUNHW%RWKZD\VLQYROYHVDGGLWLRQDOFRVWV,Q
WKH¿UVWFDVHFRVWFRPHVIURPVHSDUDWHSURFHVVLQJDQGLQWKHVHFRQGRQH²IURP
transportation. These costs have a similar effect on market equilibrium and are 
considered jointly. Assume that the marginal costs of separate processing or 
transportation are constant and equal to f¿[HGFRVWRIVHSDUDWHSURFHVVLQJDQG
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQRIDXQLWRIDJOXWDUHHTXDOWR]HUR
7KHSRVVLELOLW\RIVHOOLQJDJOXWRQDQHZPDUNHWDGGVDQHZPD[LPL]DWLRQYDUL-
DEOH WR WKHSUR¿WPD[LPL]DWLRQSUREOHPDYROXPHRIDFRSURGXFW WKDW LV VHSD-
rately processed or transported to a distant market (Q2ƍƍ$VIDUDVWKHSRVVLELOLW\
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of selling a co-product on a new market is considered only as a way to dispose of 
a glut, the volume of sale of a co-product on a new market cannot exceed a glut. 
ȡ41 –  Q2ƍ   Q2ƍƍ (23)
This condition is stricter than Q2ƍ  ȡ41, and hence if it holds, the later holds auto-
matically. 
&RQVLGHUGLIIHUHQWPDUNHWVWUXFWXUHVRQQHZDQG³ROG´PDUNHWV7RNHHSDQ³ROG´
market objective a company should possess no less market power on it in compari-
VRQWRDQHZPDUNHW7KXVDVVXPHWKDWDFRPSDQ\KDVPDUNHWSRZHURQDQ³ROG´
market and consider two cases.
1. A company has market power both on an “old” market and on a new market . 
7KHGHPDQGIXQFWLRQVRQDQ³ROG´PDUNHWWKHQFRUUHVSRQGWRHTXDWLRQV
and the demand function for a co-product on a new market has the following form: 
P2ƍƍ =  a2ƍ  –  b2ƍ42ƍƍ (24)
where a2ƍ  b2ƍ Q2ƍƍ P2ƍƍ  0.
A glut is equal to the difference between output and the level of sales of a co-
product (see 12). 
)RUVLPSOLFLW\DVVXPHWKDWD¿[HGSURSRUWLRQLVHTXDOWRȡ =  1). 
max ʌ =  max (a2 –  b2Q2ƍ )Q2ƍ +  (a1– b1Q1)Q1 –  TC(Q1) –  
Q1, Q2ƍ, Q2ƍƍ 41, Q2ƍ, Q2ƍƍ
 – d(Q1 – Q2ƍ – Q2ƍƍ) +  (a2ƍ –  b2ƍ42ƍƍ)Q2ƍƍ – fQ2ƍƍ       
s.t. Q1 –  Q2ƍ   Q2ƍƍ (25)
8VLQJD/DJUDQJHIXQFWLRQDQGFRUUHVSRQGLQJ.XKQ7XFNHUFRQGLWLRQVFRQ-
sider three cases: (1) wastage involves no cost (d = 0), (2) wastage involves cost 
(d > 0), (3) wastage is impossible (there should be no glut) (see Appendix C). 
If  Ȝ  =  0, then Q1* –  Q2ƍ  Q2ƍƍ,QWKH¿UVWFDVHd = 0. Then, a company separately 
processes or transports such amount of a co-product that marginal revenue from its 
sale on a new market is equal to the cost of separate processing or transportation. 
In the second case, d > 0. This implies that a company is ready to sell a glut on 
a new market even if marginal revenue is less than the marginal cost of separate 
processing or transportation. 
If  Ȝ  >  0, then Q1* –  Q2ƍ   Q2ƍƍ7KLVFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHWKLUGFDVHZKHQZDVWDJHLV
impossible. The optimal volume of sale of a glut is then higher than the volume that 
corresponds to equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost of separate process-
ing or transportation. In this case the optimal output of a major product falls and 
the optimal level of sale of a co-product rises. 
2. A new market is competitive, and on an “old” market a company has market 
power. Then, P2ƍLVWKHSULFHRIDFRSURGXFWRQDQHZPDUNHW
  max ʌ =  max (a2 –  b2Q2ƍ )Q2ƍ +  (a1– b1Q1)Q1 –  TC(Q1) –  
Q1, Q2ƍ, Q2ƍƍ 41, Q2ƍ, Q2ƍƍ
 – d(Q1 – Q2ƍ – Q2ƍƍ) + P2ƍ42ƍƍ – fQ2ƍƍ
s.t. Q1 –  Q2ƍ   Q2ƍƍ (26)
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$JDLQFRQVLGHUWKUHHFDVHVXVLQJD/DJUDQJHIXQFWLRQDQG.XKQ7XFNHUFRQ-
ditions (see Appendix C). 
If  Ȝ  =  0, then Q1* –  Q2ƍ  Q2ƍƍ,QWKH¿UVWFDVHd = 0. The company does not 
then separately process or transport a glut if price on a new market is lower than 
the marginal cost of separate processing or transportation. 
In the second case, d > 0. The acceptable price for a company to sell a part of 
a glut or the whole glut on a new market then positively relates to the cost of sepa-
rate processing or transportation and negatively relates to the cost of wastage. 
If  Ȝ  >  0, then Q1* –  Q2ƍ   Q2ƍƍ7KLVFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHWKLUGFDVHZKHQZDVW-
age is impossible. The acceptable price for a company to sell the whole glut then 
falls under the marginal cost of separate processing or transportation. This in turn 
explains the phenomenon when a company exports a product bearing losses. If 
it is impossible to sell a glut on a new market at a positive price (Q2ƍƍ RXWSXW
of a major product should be equal to the volume where corresponding output of 
DFRSURGXFWFDQEHVROGRQDQ³ROG´PDUNHWQ1* =  Q2ƍ
,IDQHZPDUNHWLVFRPSHWLWLYHDFRPSDQ\KDVDFKRLFHLQWKH¿UVWWZRFDVHV
when wastage is possible: to sell a glut or not. When the wastage of a glut is im-
possible, a company has to sell it at any price. As far as negative price is not taken 
into account and means that a company cannot sell a glut on this market, a compa-
Q\VKRXOGVHOOWKHZKROHRXWSXWRQDQ³ROG´PDUNHWDQGQ1* =  Q2ƍKHQFHQ2ƍƍ 
3. There also could be the case when both markets are competitive. The vol-
XPHRIVDOHRIDFRSURGXFWRQDQ³ROG´PDUNHWWKHQLVQRWDPD[LPL]LQJYDULDEOH
DQGSUR¿WPD[LPL]LQJIXQFWLRQKDVWKHIROORZLQJIRUP
   max ʌ  max  (P1Q1 + P2ƍ42ƍ –  TC(Q1) – d(Q1 – Q2ƍ – Q2ƍƍ) + P2ƍ42ƍƍ±I42ƍƍ
 
Q1, Q2ƍƍ  
Q1, Q2ƍƍ
s.t. Q1 –  Q2ƍ   Q2ƍƍ (27)
2QWKHEDVLVRIDFRUUHVSRQGLQJ/DJUDQJHIXQFWLRQDQG.XKQ7XFNHUFRQGL-
tions it is possible to make the following conclusions according to the three cases 
underlined above (see Appendix C). 
If   Ȝ  =  0, Q1  –  Q2ƍ Q2ƍƍ7KHSULFHRIDPDMRUSURGXFWVKRXOGFRYHUFRVWRISUR-
duction if d = 0, and in addition the cost of wastage if d   >  0. A glut is then sold on 
a new market if its price is equal to the cost of separate processing or transporta-
tion if d   =   0 and can be even lower if d   >  0. 
If Ȝ   >   0, wastage is impossible and Q1*  –   Q2ƍ±  Q2ƍƍ  =   0. This implies that 
a glut (Q2ƍƍ  =  Q1* –  Q2ƍLVVROGDWDQ\SRVLWLYHSULFHHYHQEHORZWKHFRVWRIVHSD-
rate processing or transportation. If a co-product cannot be sold on a new market 
(Q2ƍƍ   =   0) at a positive price, this turns us back to the situation when output of 
a major product is determined according to the possibility of selling a co-product 
on the market (Q1ƍƍ  =  Q2ƍ2XWSXWRIDPDMRUSURGXFWWKHQIDOOVDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\
its price is above the marginal cost of production. 
7KHPRGHO¶VH[WHQVLRQE\DGGLQJDQHZPDUNHWOHWVXVDQDO\]HWKHUHODWLRQVKLS
of alternative strategies of a company with respect to a glut, in particular: sale of 
KLJKHUYROXPHVRIDFRSURGXFWRQDQ³ROG´PDUNHWZDVWDJHRIDJOXWDQGVDOHRI
a glut on a new market. 
Return to the example with chlorine and caustic soda. Technological characte-
ristics of chlorine imply that it should be sold within three days after produc-
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tion. This means that transportation of chlorine to distant markets is impossible. 
+RZHYHU LW FDQ EH VHSDUDWHO\ SURFHVVHG LQWR FKORULQDWHG GHULYDWLYHV 39&
which offers an opportunity to sell a glut of chlorine on a new market (down-
VWUHDPPDUNHWRI39&7UDQVSRUWDWLRQRIFDXVWLFVRGDLVSRVVLEOHEXWLWLQYROYHV
moderate cost that enables sale of a glut of caustic soda on a distinct market. Ac-
cording to the model, if wastage is impossible, as it is in the case of caustic soda, 
a company agrees to sell a glut even at a price below the cost of transportation 
both if the company has market power on a new market and under competitive 
conditions. Thus, VDOHRIFDXVWLFDWDSULFHWKDWIURP¿UVWJODQFHLVXQMXVWL¿DEOH
with respect to domestic price is not the consequence of more intensive compe-
tition on a foreign market, but is the way of selling a glut. If sale of caustic on 
a new market is impossible, the price of chlorine exceeds the marginal costs of 
production even under competitive conditions on the market of chlorine. 
If there is a glut of chlorine, then a company’s decision about its separate pro-
cessing depends on the market structure of chlorinated derivatives and hence on 
the price at which a company can sell its product on this market because there is an 
alternative in the form of wastage in the case of chlorine. If the market of chlori-
QDWHGGHULYDWLYHVLVKLJKO\FRPSHWLWLYHWKHQWKH5XVVLDQFRPSDQ\FDQQRWLQÀXHQFH
WKHSULFHRQWKLVPDUNHW+RZHYHUDFRPSDQ\GHFLGHVWRVHSDUDWHO\SURFHVVFKOR-
rine even if the price on the market of chlorinated derivatives is below the marginal 
cost of separate processing because cost of wastage that a company incurs other-
ZLVHLVWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW+RZHYHULIVDOHRIFKORULQHRQDQHZPDUNHWDWDSRVL-
WLYHSULFHLVLPSRVVLEOHWKHSULFHRIFDXVWLFRQDQ³ROG´PDUNHWLQFUHDVHVEHFDXVH
LWVRXWSXWIDOOV,IWKH5XVVLDQFRPSDQ\KDVPDUNHWSRZHURQWKHPDUNHWIRU39&
LW VHSDUDWHO\SURFHVVHVDKLJKHUYROXPHRIFKORULQH WKDQ WKHSUR¿WPD[LPL]DWLRQ
conditions of this market demand because the cost of wastage is taken into account. 
Thus, in addition to joint costs of production and demand for each product 
the factor that determines equilibrium is cost of wastage. The higher the cost of 
ZDVWDJHWKHKLJKHUWKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWIRUDFRPSDQ\LWLVSUR¿WDEOHWRVHOODJOXW
and hence the lower its price on a new market. Other factors are costs of separate 
processing and transportation. Then, a company needs to choose between sepa-
rate processing (transportation) and sale at the split-off point. 
+HQFHRSWLPDORXWSXWVWKHOHYHOVRIVDOHDQGSULFHVRIMRLQWSURGXFWVEHIRUH
and after separate processing or transportation can differ from their optimal val-
ues if the markets of each product are considered separately disregarding nega-
tive externalities connected with a glut, of which wastage involves costs. 
7. Conclusion 
(YHQRQWKHEDVLVRIEDVLFPLFURHFRQRPLFDQDO\VLVGLVUHJDUGLQJDFRPSDQ\¶V
LQWHUQDORUJDQL]DWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFDQDO\VLVRIFRQWUDFWXDOUHODWLRQVLWLVVKRZQ
that prices and the levels of sale of joint products are different from these para-
meters as if there is no joint production, cost of wastage and the possibility of 
separate processing and transportation. 
If the antitrust authority investigates markets of joint products, it should take 
into account the peculiarities of these markets (especially in the absence of direct 
evidence). Otherwise, this could result in wrong conclusions about the nature 
of companies’ behavior and hence errors of law enforcement. The engagement 
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of experts of each industry under investigation who can provide comprehensive 
DQDO\VLVRI WKHLU IXQFWLRQLQJ LV LPSRUWDQW LQ UHJDUG WR LQFUHDVLQJ WKHHI¿FLHQF\
of antitrust policy tools (Schmalensee, 2012). This could improve the balance of 
the type 1 and the type 2 errors in law enforcement practice. 
Appendix A
ʌ  TR1(Q1)  +  TR2(Q1)  –  TC(Q1)  =  (a1  –  b1Q1)Q1  +  
 +  (a2  –  b2ȡ41)ȡ41  –  TC(Q1) (A.1)
max ʌ ĺ  a1  –  2b1Q1 +  ȡD2  –  2b2ȡ2Q1 –  ɫ =  0 (A.2)
    Q1
MR1(Q1)  +  MR2(Q1)  –  c  =  0 (A.3)
MRtotal (Q1)  =  c (A.4)
2SWLPDORXWSXWRIWKH¿UVWPDMRUSURGXFW
 (A.5)
Corresponding output of the second product (co-product): 
 (A.6)
Appendix B
Y  =  Q1 –  Q1(MR2(Q1)  =  0 %
The higher YLVWKHKLJKHUWKHSUREDELOLW\RIDJOXWDQGLWVVL]HLV
MR2(Q1)  =  0 %
ȡD2  –  2b2ȡ2Q1  =  0  %
 %
According to equation (C.1):
 %
Then, 
 %
,   ,    %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Appendix C
.XKQ7XFNHU 
conditions
Company has market power Market is competitive There is a possibility of separate processing and economy is open
Wastage of a glut Wastage of a glut  
is impossible
Wastage of a glut Wastage  
of a glut is 
impossible
Company has market 
power both on new  
DQG³ROG´PDUNHWV
A new market is 
competitive, on an 
³ROG´PDUNHWDFRPSDQ\
has market power
%RWKPDUNHWVDUH
competitive
/DJUDQJH 
function
L  = ʌ + Ȝ(Q2ƍ –  ȡ41)
where Ȝ 
L  = ʌ + Ȝ(Q1 –  a2 /b2)
where Ȝ 
L  = ʌ + Ȝ(Q2ƍ±ȡ41)
where Ȝ 
L  = ʌ + Ȝ(Q2ƍ±ȡ41)
where Ȝ 
L  = ʌ + Ȝ(Q2ƍ±ȡ41)
where Ȝ 
a1 – 2b1Q1* –  c  – 
 –  Gȡ  – ȡȜ  =  0
a1+ a2– (2b1+ b2)Q1* –  c  + 
 +  Ȝ  =  0
a1 – 2b1Q1* –  c  –  
 –  d  – Ȝ  =  0
a1 – 2b1Q1* –  c  –  
 –  d  – Ȝ  =  0
P1 – MC(Q1*) –  
 –  d  – Ȝ  =  0
MR1(Q1*) or P1 c  + Gȡ  + ȡȜ c  –  Ȝ P1  =  MC (Q1*)   +  ȡG c  +  d  + Ȝ c  +  d  + Ȝ MC(Q1*)  +  d  + Ȝ
Q1*
a2 – 2b2Q2 ƍ±
 –  d  + Ȝ  =  0
a2 – 2b2Q2 ƍ
 +  d  + Ȝ  =  0
a2 – 2b2Q2 ƍ
 +  d  + Ȝ  =  0
MR2(Q2 ƍ d  – Ȝ d  – Ȝ d  – Ȝ
Q2 ƍ
d + a2 ƍ±b2Q2 ƍƍ±
 –  f  + Ȝ  =  0 d + P2 ƍ±f  + Ȝ  =  0 –f  + P2 ƍd  + Ȝ  =  0
MR2 ƍQ2 ƍƍRUP2 ƍ f  –  d  + Ȝ f  –  d  – Ȝ f  –  d  – Ȝ
Q2 ƍƍ
ȡ41* – Q2 ƍ a2/b2  –  Q1 Q1*– Q2 ƍ±Q2 ƍƍ Q1*– Q2 ƍ±Q2 ƍƍ Q1*– Q2 ƍ±Q2 ƍƍ
Ȝ(ȡ41* – Q2 ƍ  Ȝ(a2/b2  –  Q1*)  =  0 Ȝ(ȡ41*– Q2 ƍ±Q2 ƍƍ  Ȝ(ȡ41*– Q2 ƍ±Q2 ƍƍ  Ȝ(ȡ41*– Q2 ƍ±Q2 ƍƍ 
Ȝ  Ȝ  Ȝ  Ȝ  Ȝ 
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Appendix D
 (D.1)
 (D.2)
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